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1. Introduction
A large number of audit firms have combined in
the UK since the 1980s. Table 1 shows that the
various mergers and the demise of Andersen have
reduced the number of first-tier accounting firms
(hereafter Big Firms) from eight in 1985 to four in
2002. Industrial economists use the structure-con-
duct-performance paradigm to urge regulators to
be wary of reductions in the number of suppliers.
Interesting research questions raised by this para-
digm are how and to what extent have the structure
of the audit market and the pricing policies of the
major accounting firms been affected by the merg-
ers and Andersen transaction? We examine audit
pricing in the context of the industry restructuring
that occurred during the 1980–2003 period as a re-
sult of mergers between large audit firms and the
disappearance of Andersen (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Andersen transaction’).
This study contributes to the literature by inves-
tigating the effect of structural changes in the mar-
ket for audit services on concentration and the
pricing of the audits of UK listed companies. The
UK provides an interesting empirical setting for a
number of reasons. UK companies have long re-
ported audit fee information in their annual finan-
cial statements (Companies Act 1967), making it
possible to carry out a longitudinal study that is not
yet possible in the US.1 Furthermore, the London
market is one of the world’s largest, making it eas-
ier to test theories of audit pricing than in small
markets like Hong Kong. We have exploited these
institutional features to conduct a more compre-
hensive study over a longer time frame than in the
prior literature.
We find that the largest increases in concentra-
tion ratios coincided with Big Firm mergers in
1989, 1990 and 1997. By 2002, concentration ra-
tios reached levels that are consistent with a mar-
ket structure of just over four equal sized firms,
exceeding levels normally associated with a tight
oligopoly. These structural changes appear to have
had a variable effect on audit fees. There is some
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 37. No. 4. pp. 301-319. 2007 301
The effect of large audit firm mergers on
audit pricing in the UK
Kevin P. McMeeking, Ken V. Peasnell and Peter F. Pope*
Abstract—This paper examines the effects on UK audit market concentration and pricing of mergers between the
large audit firms and the demise of Andersen. Based on data over the period 1985–2002, it appears that mergers
contributed to a rise in concentration ratios to levels that suggest concern about the potential for monopoly pricing.
The high concentration ratios have not improved the level of price competition in the UK audit market. Our pooled
models suggest that concentration ratios are associated with higher audit fees. The evidence suggests that the ef-
fects of mergers between big firms on brand name fee premium and on price competition vary depending on the
particular circumstances. The brand name premium is strongest for the largest quartile of companies prior to the
mergers. After the Big Six mergers, the premium increases for average-sized companies but falls for the smallest
and largest companies. Following the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger, the premium increases for below median-
sized clients but decreases for above-median sized clients. For the Deloitte-Andersen transaction, the premium falls
for the smallest and largest companies but increases for those in the second quartile. Our results provide evidence
that auditees are likely to pay higher fees if their auditor merges with a larger counterpart. We attribute merger-re-
lated fee hikes to product differentiation, rather than anti-competitive pricing.
Key words: concentration, mergers, pricing, oligopoly, choice
*McMeeking is at Exeter University. Peasnell and Pope are
at Lancaster University. This research benefited from the gen-
erous financial support from the International Centre for
Research in Accounting. Previous copies of the paper were
presented at the 2005 British Accounting Association Auditing
SIG conference and the 2005 EARNet conference. We are
very grateful to Ashni Singh and Richard Patterson for re-
search assistance and for the helpful comments of Peter
Moizer, Ilias Basioudis, Vivien Beattie, David Citron, Terry
Cooke, Paul Dunnmore, Aasmund Eilifsen, Jere Francis,
David Gwilliam, Pelham Gore, Jonathan Hayward, Clive
Lennox, Mark Tippett, Stuart Turley, Steven Young, the editor
(Pauline Weetman) and two anonymous reviewers. Any re-
maining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.
Address for correspondence: Kevin McMeeking, School of
Business & Economics, Streatham Court, Exeter University,
Exeter, EX4 4PU, email: k.p.mcmeeking@ex.ac.uk, Tel:
(0044) +1392 263206 (direct line), (0044) +1392 263201 (sec-
retary), Fax: (0044) +1392 263210
This paper was accepted for publication in August 2007.
1 US firms have only been required to disclose the fees paid
to auditors in statements filed on or after 5 February 2001
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2000). Researchers
using US data have therefore had to focus on measures like the
number of audits, clients’ turnover or clients’ asset values as
the measurement base because of the lack of available audit
fee data (Moizer and Turley, 1989: 42).
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Table 1
History of mergers and other transactions involving first-tier accounting firms since 1984
Date Country Attempted merger D-A transaction Failure/Success
1984 US and UK PW and DH Failure
1986 US and UK PM and KMG Success
1989 US and UK EW and AY Success
1989 US and UK PW and AA Failure
1989 US DH and TR Success
1989 UK DH and TR Failure
1990 UK DH and CL Success
1990 UK TR and SP Mainly success
1994 US and UK AA and BH Mixed
1997 US and UK CL and PW Success
1997 US and UK EY and KPMG Failure
2002 UK D-A Success
Audit partnerships are named as follows: AA = Arthur Andersen; A = Andersen; AY = Arthur Young; BH =
Binder Hamlyn; CL = Coopers and Lybrand; D = Deloitte; DH = Deloitte Haskins and Sells; EW = Ernst and
Whinney; EY = Ernst and Young; KMG = KMG Thomson McLintock; KPMG = KPMG; PM = Peat Marwick;
PW = Price Waterhouse; SP = Spicer and Pegler and TR = Touche Ross.
evidence to suggest that the high concentration ra-
tios have reduced the level of price competition, an
effect that may be attributed to product differenti-
ation. The ability of large audit firms to charge a
brand premium might be a function of willingness
to pay. This might be expected to be stronger for
larger clients, and this is what we observe in the
1985–1988 period before the mergers. However,
the pattern is more complex in the later part of our
sample period. Our findings indicate that the brand
name premium increased for average-sized com-
panies (i.e. those in the second and third size quar-
tiles) after the Big Six mergers but fell for the
smallest and the largest companies. Following the
PricewaterhouseCoopers merger, the brand name
premium increased (decreased) for clients whose
size is below the median (above the median). The
picture is even more complex following the
Andersen transaction – the premium fell for the
smallest and largest client quartiles but increased
for those in the second quartile. We attribute these
findings to the Big Firms engaging in a product
differentiation strategy. Our findings using nomi-
nal prices indicate that the 1989 merger raised the
audit fees of Arthur Young clients relative to the
same clients previously audited by Ernst and
Whinney2 and the 1990 merger increased the
Coopers and Lybrand fee premium over Deloitte.3
The 1997 merger reduced the size of the nominal
fee discount offered by Price Waterhouse relative
to Coopers and Lybrand. Up to the end of our sam-
ple period the 2002 transaction had no material ef-
fect on the nominal audit fees of Deloitte and
Andersen former clients. Using inflation adjusted
audit fees, we find that Coopers and Lybrand and
Ernst and Young clients paid higher real audit fees
relative to clients of the benchmark firm (KPMG).
On the other hand, Andersen clients paid lower
real audit fees in the run up to being forced out of
business. This audit firm transaction is significant-
ly different from the others because the Enron de-
bacle left a stigma not present in other mergers.
The remainder of this paper is organised as fol-
lows. The next section reviews the extant literature.
Section 3 outlines the research design. The data
collection procedures are explained in Section 4.
The results are presented in Section 5 and a sum-
mary is provided in Section 6.
2. Prior research
Industrial economists argue that market structure
is intrinsically linked to firm behaviour and finan-
2 The UK combination between Arthur Young and Ernst and
Whinney on 1 September 1989 was officially a merger but
was seen by some writers as a takeover by Ernst and Whinney
because several of the previously high-ranking Arthur Young
partners left the following year. This anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that Ernst and Whinney had a stronger brand name rep-
utation than Arthur Young (supporting the evidence of the fee
regressions).
3 The Deloitte case provides an exclusive opportunity to ex-
amine the effects of brand name. In July 1989, the US partners
of Deloitte Haskins & Sells and those of Touche Ross suggest-
ed a merger. Deloitte in the UK and Haskins & Sells in the US
had very different attitudes to this proposal. The US Deloitte
partners overwhelming voted to proceed with the merger
whereas the UK Deloitte partners chose to merge with
Coopers and Lybrand with the official fusion to Coopers and
Lybrand Deloitte taking place on 29 April 1990. The potential
for confusion caused by two firms signing off as Deloitte was
eased on 1 June 1992 when Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte
dropped the name Deloitte, becoming Coopers and Lybrand.
Coopers allowed Touche Ross to acquire the name Deloitte in
1996 to form Deloitte and Touche (Moizer, 2005: 4).
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cial performance (Scherer and Ross, 1990; Martin,
1994). Scholars urge regulators to be wary of the
pricing effects of merger-induced increases in
market concentration (Stigler, 1968: 30; Gist and
Michaels, 1995: 233; Romeo, 1999: 62).4 There is
considerable evidence that audit market concentra-
tion has increased over time in the UK (Briston
and Kedslie, 1984; Moizer and Turley, 1989;
Beattie and Fearnley, 1994; Pong, 1999) and in
other countries (Zeff and Fossum, 1967; Rhode et
al, 1974; Hermanson et al., 1987; Wolk et al.,
2001). Beattie and Fearnley (1994: 308) contend
that, ‘auditor concentration in the UK market for
listed audit services has now almost reached the
limit of a tight oligopoly, which is a market struc-
ture characterised by few rivals, stable market
shares and medium to high entry barriers’.
Concentration levels increased further following
the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger and the de-
mise of Andersen. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(2002), the recommendations of the Treasury
Committee (2002) and the Coordinating Group on
Audit and Accounting Issues (2003) indicate the
extent of the concerns about the audit services
market in both the US and UK (Beattie et al.,
2003: 251).
The extant literature on the effect of mergers on
the economy is mixed (Francis et al., 1999).
Consumer welfare will increase if mergers reduce
marginal costs, create efficiencies and enhance
product differentiation but will decrease if mergers
enable tacit collusion over prices or if unilateral
anticompetitive effects arise from non-tacit price
collusion (Sullivan, 2002: 381–384). Concerns
about the welfare implications of the 1989–1990
mergers (Wootton et al. 1994: 58–59) were qui-
etened by the lack of opposition from the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the
Office of Fair Trading in the UK and the
Department of Justice in the USA, and by evi-
dence that auditors significantly cut fees to win au-
dits in the 1980s (Simunic, 1980; Francis and
Simon, 1987; Simon and Francis, 1988; Pong and
Whittington, 1994; Gregory and Collier, 1996).5
Although Pong (2004) documents a 17.5% reduc-
tion in inflation-adjusted UK audit fees from 1991
to 1995, there has been little recent work that 
has addressed this issue. This lack of evidence, 
and the structural changes resulting from the
PricewaterhouseCoopers merger and the demise of
Andersen, have rekindled concerns about the com-
petitiveness of the audit market (Hermanson et al.,
1987; Gist and Michaels, 1995; Pong, 1998;
Willekens and Achmadi, 2003) and worries that
that consumer choice will be further impaired if
further mergers or takeovers occur (Oxera
Consulting Limited, 2006).
It is difficult to test the welfare effects of merg-
ers because audit firms have traditionally been or-
ganised as unlimited liability partnerships. This
makes access to proprietary data on costs and prof-
itability impossible. Researchers have tried to cir-
cumvent this problem by examining audit fees
before and after a combination, but the results
have been mixed. Tai and Kwong (1997) analysed
audit fees using Hong Kong data between 1988
and 1991. They found that real audit fees increased
significantly over this period. Ivancevich and
Zardkoohi (2000) compared accounting funda-
mentals for four US audit firms involved in the
1989–1990 mergers against competitor firms that
were not involved in mergers. Following the merg-
ers, the market share and audit fees of the merged
firms fell relative to their non-merging rivals.
Menon and Williams (2001) examined US audit
fees for international accounting firm clients be-
tween 1980 and 1997. They document a signifi-
cant positive effect on audit fees for three years
after mergers (1991–1993), but this premium sub-
sequently disappears. Iyer and Iyer (1996) com-
pared the UK audit fees earned by Big Eight firms
in 1987 with Big Six firms in 1991. Although con-
centration levels increased over the period, there
was no evidence of any associated significant in-
crease in audit fees. Firth and Lau (2004) examine
the effect of accounting firm mergers on audit fees
using a sample of Hong Kong companies. Their
paper investigates the effect of a merger on any
audit fee premium that existed before the combina-
tion. They find that the size of the premium earned
by a brand name firm (Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu)
over a non-brand name firm (Kwan Wong Tan and
Fong) fell from 55% before the merger to 34%
shortly after the merger. In contrast, there was no
change in the audit fee premium earned by two
brand name firms (Price Waterhouse and Coopers
and Lybrand) after the merger. These results sug-
gest that pre-merger premiums of the brand name
auditor pass to the other auditor after a merger but
do not transfer for re-branding amongst interna-
tional firms.
3. Research design
The present study contributes to this literature 
by investigating the effects of the 1989–1990 
Big Six mergers, the 1997 merger between Price
Vol. 37 No. 4. 2007 303
4 Moizer and Turley (1989: 41) define concentration as ‘the
extent to which a relatively small number of audit firms ac-
count for a significant proportion of the total audit work car-
ried out.’
5 Opinion surveys have yielded results consistent with this
research. One survey by the City Research Group found that
81% of the financial executives surveyed by the City Research
Group questioning the audit fee (Anonymous, December
1991: 11). Another survey showed that 61% of the accountant
respondents thought that ‘discounting audit fees was wide-
spread’ (Lea, 1991). The leaked Price Waterhouse tender that
allegedly included a £900,000 discount was also the subject of
press comment (Plender, 1991).
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Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand and the
2002 Deloitte-Andersen transaction on audit pric-
ing in the UK. We start our analysis by estimating
concentration ratios to assess the potential for mo-
nopoly pricing in the audit market. Consistent with
prior work, we define audit activity based on the
number of audit clients each audit firm has and the
firm’s audit fee revenue (Wootton et. al., 1994;
Pong, 1998, 1999; Wolk et. al., 2001). We use the
concentration ratio (CR) and Herfindahl Index
(H)6 because these are widely used by academics
and regulators such as the US Department of
Justice (Utton, 1970; Briston and Kedslie, 1984;
Moizer and Turley, 1989; Beattie and Fearnley,
1994; Pong, 1999). CR and H are descriptive sta-
tistics that prima facie suggest whether one should
be concerned about the potential for anti-competi-
tive pricing in the audit market. A positive result
leads us to investigate whether the UK audit mar-
ket has become more monopolistic following the
accounting firm mergers. Our analysis focuses on
the mergers between international accounting
firms because these combinations are fewer in
number and are likely to have a larger impact on
market structure and conduct than those taking
place between smaller firms.
3.1 Empirical questions
The central issue is the effect of the big firm
mergers on audit pricing, which we sum up in the
following question:
EQ1: What are the fee effects for clients of larg-
er audit firms following mergers?
Mergers can improve consumer welfare by cre-
ating efficiencies or decrease consumer welfare by
creating conditions conducive to monopoly pric-
ing (Sullivan, 2002: 381–384). Simunic (1980) ar-
gues that some segments of the market could be
more competitive than others; this could have an
impact on the effects of the mergers on audit pric-
ing. We follow this line of thought by using the
small client market as the competitive benchmark
and investigating whether fees change around the
time of the mergers. In other words, we test
whether the mergers have enabled the brand name
firms to pass on any cost savings associated with
efficiencies to their clients in the form of a reduc-
tion in the assumed audit fee premium or allowed
the Big Firms to use their power or reputation to
increase the audit fee premium. This empirical
question is tested by running a quality differentia-
tion regression across sub-samples of clients parti-
tioned by total assets in the periods surrounding
the combinations:7
LAFi = α1,0 + β1,1 Controlsi + β1,2 Brandi + ε1,i, (1)
where LAF is the natural logarithm of total audit
fees (£000); Brand, is an indicator variable set
equal to one if the auditor is a brand name firm and
zero otherwise; Controls is a vector of control vari-
ables capturing audit fee determinants identified in
the prior literature (e.g. Francis and Simon, 1987;
Simon and Francis, 1988; Beatty, 1993; Anderson
and Zeghal, 1994) as follows: LTA = natural loga-
rithm of total assets (£m); Sub = square root of the
number of subsidiaries; Current = ratio of current
assets to current liabilities; Loss = 1 if an operat-
ing loss was reported in any 1 of the prior 3 years,
0 otherwise; Quick = ratio of current assets less
stock to current liabilities; DTA = ratio of long-
term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of earnings
before interest and tax to total assets; Foreign =
proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign opera-
tions; YE = 1 if the accounting year end is between
December and March inclusive, 0 otherwise; and
ε1,i is the regression residual. The control variables
are designed to capture effort-related variation in
audit fees (LTA), litigation risk (DTA, ROI,
Current and Quick) and complexity (Sub,
Foreign).
The second issue we address concerns the ef-
fects of a merger on audit fees charged by specific
audit firms around the time of the merger. There is
a considerable body of theory and evidence sug-
gesting that the large accounting firms have differ-
entiated themselves from smaller competitors on
the basis of perceptions of quality and that they are
able to attract premium fees for their investment in
a brand name reputation (e.g. Francis and Simon,
1987; Simon and Francis, 1988; Beatty, 1993;
304 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
6 The CR measures the percentage of the total activity (e.g.
number of clients or size of audit fees) that is accounted for by
the largest firms as follows:
where n is the number of large audit firms and Si is the size of
audit firm i as a percentage of the size of the market. This
study uses the N-firm concentration ratio (CRn) to examine the
dominance of the eight (1985–1989), six (1990–1996), five
(1997–1999) and four (2000–2002) largest accounting firms
over medium and small firms. Consistent with prior studies
(Briston and Kedslie, 1984; Moizer and Turley, 1989; Beattie
and Fearnley, 1994; Pong, 1999), we also use the four-firm
concentration ratio (CR4) to express the percentage of the
total activity that is accounted for by the leading four firms in
the market.
One limitation of these measures is that they pay little atten-
tion to the number and size of other firms in the market. The
Herfindahl Index (H) provides a more comprehensive measure
(Utton, 1970: 35–51; Moizer and Turley, 1989: 44; Pong,
1999: 455):
where, M is the total number of (big and small) firms in the
audit market and Si is the size of audit firm i as a percentage
of the size of the entire market.
7 The first subscript, 1, in equation (1) signifies that the re-
gression is based on equation (1), the second subscript, i,
refers to firm-year.
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McMeeking et al., 2006). A possible motive for
smaller accounting firms to merge with larger ones
is that it is expected that the clients of the smaller
partner will be willing to pay more because of per-
ceptions that the quality of the service provided
will have increased as a result of the merger. This
is most likely to take place when the disparity in
size is marked. However, an interesting question is
whether it also arises when both merger parties are
large. In such circumstances, fees may rise due to
market forces or product differentiation or fall due
to economies of scale and/or scope (Francis, et. al.,
1999). This leads us to our second research ques-
tion:
EQ2: What are the fee effects for clients of audit
firms merging with larger audit firms?
We test EQ2 in two ways. First, we run panel
audit fee regressions for the sub-sample of compa-
nies whose auditors were involved in mergers.
Following Firth and Lau (2004), we examine audit
pricing over three time intervals: three years be-
fore the merger; the year of the merger, and three
years subsequent to the merger. For the first three
mergers, we also examine pricing over different
event windows because the choice of appropriate
window is not obvious, a priori. For the Deloitte-
Andersen transaction, in 2002 we use only one
post-transaction observation because of the lack of
available data at the time of collection. Audit fee
differences between the combining firms are cap-
tured using a series of dummy variables.
To capture audit fee variation for the Arthur
Young and Ernst and Whinney merger in 1989, we
restrict our sample to Arthur Young, Ernst and
Whinney, and Ernst and Young clients. In other
words, an auditee must have been both a post-
merger client of Ernst and Young and also a pre-
merger client of either Arthur Young or Ernst and
Whinney.8 Similarly, to model audit fee variation
for the Coopers and Lybrand and Deloitte, Haskins
and Sells 1990 merger, we restrict our sample to
Coopers and Lybrand, Deloitte, Haskins and Sells
and Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte clients. To be
included in the sample, a company must have been
both a pre-merger client of Deloitte, Haskins and
Sells or Coopers and Lybrand and a post-merger
client of Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte. To capture
audit fee variation for the Price Waterhouse and
Coopers and Lybrand 1997 merger, we restrict our
sample to Price Waterhouse, Coopers and Lybrand
and PricewaterhouseCoopers clients, with sample
firms having to be both pre- and post-merger
clients of these firms. Finally, for the Deloitte-
Andersen 2002 transaction, we restrict our sample
to clients that before the transaction were audited
by either Deloitte and Touche or Andersen and 
afterwards by the new Deloitte firm.
Based on the research design in Firth and Lau
(2004), we use the following generic regression
model to test how audit prices were affected by
merger activity:
LAFi = α2,0 + β2,1EWprei + β2,2PostEYi (2)
+ β2,3EYmergei + β2,4CLprei + β2,5PostCLDi
+ β2,6CLDmergei + β2,7PWprei
+ β2,8PostPWCi + β2,9PWCmergei
+ β2,10DTprei + β2,11PostDi + β2,12Dmergei
+ β2,13Controlsi + ε2,i
As before, LAF is the natural logarithm of total
audit fees (£000) and includes both pre- and post-
merger observations; EWpre, PostEY, EYmerge,
CLpre, PostCLD, CLDmerge, PWpre, PostPWC,
PWCmerge, DTpre, PostD and Dmerge are di-
chotomous treatment variables. EWpre is set equal
to 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and the
auditor is Ernst and Whinney; if the auditor prior
to the merger is Arthur Young or the observation is
after the merger then EWpre is 0. PostEY is set
equal to 1 for a post-merger observation and 0 oth-
erwise. EYmerge is set equal to 1 for a post-merg-
er observation where the client was originally
audited by Ernst and Whinney and 0 otherwise.
CLpre is set equal to 1 if the observation is prior to
the merger and the auditor at that time is Coopers
and Lybrand and 0 otherwise. PostCLD is set
equal to 1 for a post-merger observation and 0 oth-
erwise. CLDmerge is set equal to 1 if the observa-
tion is after the merger and the original auditor was
Coopers and Lybrand and zero otherwise. PWpre
is set equal to 1 if the observation is prior to the
merger and the auditor at that time is Price
Waterhouse and 0 otherwise. PostPWC is set equal
to 1 for a post-merger observation and 0 otherwise.
PWCmerge is set equal to 1 if the observation is
after the merger and the original auditor was Price
Waterhouse and zero otherwise. DTpre is set equal
to 1 if the observation is prior to the transaction
and the auditor at that time is Deloitte and Touche
and 0 otherwise. PostD is set equal to 1 for a post-
transaction observation and 0 otherwise. Finally,
Dmerge is set equal to 1 if the observation is after
the transaction and the original auditor was
Deloitte and Touche and zero otherwise. The first 
subscript, 2, signifies that the regression is based
on equation (2), the second subscript, i, refers to
firm-year, ε2,i is the regression residual and
Controls is the vector of the same control variables
Vol. 37 No. 4. 2007 305
8 We exclude clients of other auditors who switched to the
combined Ernst and Young firm after the merger and pre-
merger clients of either Arthur Young or Ernst and Whinney
who defected to other audit firms. A problem with this design
is that we might observe fee cutting by the non-defecting
clients caused by their demanding a reward for staying loyal.
This does not, however, affect what is of primary interest in
our study, namely, the relative changes in the fees of clients of
the combining audit firms. As we explain later, our models es-
timated across the full sample of audit clients circumvent the
latter problem.
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as specified for model 1.
The logic underlying this research design is as
follows. A positive β2,1 coefficient captures any pre-
mium that Ernst and Whinney earned over Arthur
Young prior to the merger. A positive β2,2 coeffi-
cient indicates the increase in fees experienced by
Arthur Young clients following the merger and β2,2
+ β2,3 is the corresponding increase for Ernst and
Whinney clients. Thus a positive β2,3 coefficient
captures the additional post-merger premium paid
by clients originally audited by Ernst and Whinney.
Similarly, a positive β2,4 coefficient captures any
premium that Coopers and Lybrand earned prior to
the merger, a positive β2,5 coefficient estimates the
post-merger premium paid by continuing Deloitte,
Haskins and Sells clients and a positive β2,6 coeffi-
cient measures any incremental post-merger premi-
um of the Coopers and Lybrand clients. β2,7
captures any premium that Price Waterhouse earned
prior to the merger, β2,8 the post-merger premium
paid by continuing Coopers and Lybrand clients
and β2,9 any incremental post-merger premium of
the Price Waterhouse clients. β2,10 captures any 
premium that Deloitte and Touche earned prior to
the transaction, β2,11 the post-transaction premium
paid by continuing Andersen clients and β2,12 any
incremental post-transaction premium of the
Deloitte and Touche clients.
One limitation of the Firth and Lau (2004)
methodology is that merger-induced audit fee
changes cannot be distinguished from fee varia-
tions across the entire audit market. We circumvent
this problem by investigating audit pricing for the
clients of the firms involved in the four mergers
and those that were excluded from merger activity.
We do this by running a pooled model that contains
the previous control variables, a non-brand name
firm dummy and dichotomous variables indicating
whether the observations relate to a firm that was
involved in the mergers. The advantages of this de-
sign is that it controls for omitted factors that might
confound the results and allows one to see how any
merger-related premium varies vis-à-vis the firm
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Table 2
Definitions of the variables used in the real audit-pricing model (4)
Variable Definition
EWpre 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and Ernst and Whinney are the auditors and Ernst and
Young audit the client after the merger, 0 otherwise.
AYpre 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and Arthur Young are the auditors and Ernst and Young
audit the client after the merger, 0 otherwise.
EYpost 1 if the auditor prior to the merger is Ernst and Whinney, the observation is after the merger and
Ernst and Young audit the client, 0 otherwise.
CLpre 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and Coopers and Lybrand are the auditors and Coopers
and Lybrand Deloitte audit the client after the merger, 0 otherwise.
DHSpre 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and Deloitte, Haskins and Sells are the auditors and
Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte audit the client after the merger, 0 otherwise.
CLpost 1 if the auditor prior to the merger is Coopers and Lybrand, the observation is after the merger
and Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte audit the client, 0 otherwise.
PWpre 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and Price Waterhouse are the auditors and
PricewaterhouseCoopers audit the client after the merger, 0 otherwise.
Cpre 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and Coopers and Lybrand are the auditors and
PricewaterhouseCoopers audit the client after the merger, 0 otherwise.
PWCpost 1 if the auditor prior to the merger is Price Waterhouse, the observation is after the merger and
PricewaterhouseCoopers audit the client, 0 otherwise.
Dpre 1 if the observation is prior to the transaction and Deloitte and Touche are the auditors and
Deloitte audit the client after the transaction, 0 otherwise.
Apre 1 if the observation is prior to the transaction and Andersen are the auditors and Deloitte audit
the client after the transaction, 0 otherwise.
Dpost 1 if the auditor prior to the transaction is Deloitte and Touche, the observation is after the trans-
action and Deloitte audits the client, 0 otherwise.
NBF 1 if a non brand-name firm audits the client, 0 otherwise.
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that was not involved in merger activity with one of
its international counterparts (KPMG). One prob-
lem with running a pooled estimation across the ex-
tended (1985–2002) time frame is that audit fees
may increase significantly due to the effects of gen-
eral price inflation. Following Pong (2004), we ac-
count for inflationary driven audit fee changes
using measures of the retail price index to adjust
the nominal audit fees into real audit fees based on
the month of the company’s financial year-end.
Differences in real audit fees are captured using the
following model:
LRAFi = α3,0 + β3,1EWprei + β3,2AYprei (3)
+ β3,3EYposti + β3,4CLprei + β3,5DHSprei
+ β3,6CLDposti + β3,7PWpre
+ β3,8Cprei + β3,9PWCposti
+ β3,10Dprei + β3,11Aprei + β3,12DPosti
+ β3,13NBF + β3,14Controlsi + ε3,i
LRAF is the natural logarithm of real (inflation
adjusted) audit fees (£000) and other variables are
as defined before (see Table 2).
4. Data collection
The data were taken from a population of 1,596
UK companies listed on both the London Stock
Exchange and the Standard and Poor’s Global
Vantage database. Our final sample consists of a
wide range of clients that reported data on the
Global Vantage, Thomson Analytics Worldscope
Datastream International, Extel Company Research
databases and the International Stock Exchange
Yearbook. Data on total assets, debt, earnings be-
fore interest and tax, financial year-end, quick
ratio, current ratio, operating profit and industry
listing code data were collected for the period
1985–2002 from the Global Vantage and Thomson
Analytics Worldscope databases. Audit data were
collated from the Datastream International, Extel
Company Research and Thomson Analytics
Worldscope databases. Subsidiary and auditor
identity data were hand collected from hard copies
of the International Stock Exchange Yearbook and
published annual reports. We eliminated financial
firms from the analysis because of lack of compa-
rability with non-financial firms’ financial state-
ments and because the cost structure of audits in
financial firms differs significantly from those of
industrials. Extreme observations in the top and
bottom percentiles of total assets, total debt, oper-
ating profit, pre-tax profits, earnings before inter-
est and tax and audit fees were eliminated from the
sample.9 The final sample comprises 7,255 firm-
year observations covering the period 1985–2002.
Consistent with other studies, the models in-
clude logarithmic or square root transformations
of the value of audit fees, total assets and sub-
sidiaries variables, as appropriate. This mitigates
the possibility that large auditees will dominate the
results. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and
shows how these transformation procedures re-
duced the extent of skewness in the distribution of
the assets, debt and earnings variables.
Untabulated Pearson correlation coefficients are
mostly insignificant. In relation to the explanatory
variables, the correlation coefficients between
Current and Quick (0.69) and between LTA and
Sub (0.59) are the only ones of any magnitude.
However, untabulated variance inflation factors
were all lower than the conventional cut-off point
of 10, suggesting that it is unlikely that multi-
collinearity materially affects our findings.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Market share estimates based on the number of
audit clients (CRn, CR4 and H) from 1985 to 2002
are reported in Table 4. Between 1985 and 2002,
CRn increased from 65% to 83%, CR4 from 45%
to 80% and H from 13% to 22% based on the num-
ber of audit clients. Using the audit fee as a meas-
urement basis, CRn increased from 77% to 95%,
CR4 from 59% to 88% and H from 13% to 23%
over the same period.
As a basis of comparison, the Herfindahl find-
ings for 2002 are equivalent to a market of just
over four firms of equal size and are even larger
than the levels identified in the prior UK literature
(9.6%, Moizer and Turley, 1989: 45; 16.97%,
Pong, 1999: 472) as signifying a tight oligopolistic
market structure.10 Concentration ratios increased
rapidly around the time of the Big Firm mergers
and reached levels in 2002 that suggest that that
the potential for price collusion is high.
Unreported auditor market shares across four
quartiles defined by client size indicate that con-
centration is an increasing function of client size.
The high and increasing levels of concentration
based on numbers of audit clients and on fee rev-
enues suggest that that the potential for price col-
lusion is particularly high in the largest client
segment. The issue we turn to next is the impact
this industry consolidation had on the relative
rankings of audit firms.
Rankings of the audit firms based on estimated
Vol. 37 No. 4. 2007 307
9 However, the key results are not materially different re-
gardless of whether the extreme observations are Winsorised
or included in the sample.
10 We use the Parker (1991) methodology to compare the
observed concentration ratios with their corresponding critical
concentration ratios. Consistent with Willekens and Achmadi
(2003: 441), we compute the 5% critical levels to determine
whether the market is significantly concentrated. We find that
statistically significant concentration ratios are observed for
CRn in 1988 and from 1992–1998 and for CR4 in 1985, 1986,
1988 and 1999–2000.
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market share of audit fees are reported in Table 5.
The leading four firms in 1985 were Peat Marwick,
Deloitte Haskins and Sells, Price Waterhouse and
Touche Ross. Consistent with Moizer (2005), we
find that Deloitte Haskins and Sells and Ernst and
Whinney had larger market shares than Coopers
and Lybrand and Arthur Young respectively in
1987 and the Big Six mergers increased the market
share of the merging firms to produce a new top
four of KPMG, Coopers and Lybrand, Price
Waterhouse and Ernst and Young. A substantial in-
crease in market share of PricewaterhouseCoopers
following the 1997 merger helped that firm to be-
come the leading audit firm. The Andersen transac-
tion resulted in a revised top four comprising
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte and
Ernst and Young.
5.2 Monopolistic or competitive pricing
We now turn our attention to the effect industry
restructuring had on the pricing of audit services.
The mean parameter estimates and t-statistics
taken from the cross-section regressions are docu-
mented in the following tables for the areas of in-
terest. The t-statistics are estimated using the
White (1980) procedure because there is some ev-
idence of heteroskedasticity. We show in bold type
the coefficients that are significant at the 5% level
or better. In all of the regressions, the models are
significant at the p<0.01 level, exhibit strong ex-
planatory power (R2 generally around 70%), and
the control variables possess the anticipated signs
and are significant at the p<0.05 level (except Loss
and ROI, which are sometimes insignificant).
Since concentration levels appear to have
reached record levels by the end of the sample pe-
riod, we investigate whether the mergers resulted
in the Big Firms charging higher audit fees than
their smaller counterparts and if so whether this is
due to product differentiation or monopolistic pric-
ing. Evidence that the audit firms were charging
310 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 5
Audit firm rankings based on UK fees relating to the audit
AA EW AY EY CL DHS CLD KPMG PW PWC TR D
1985 8 5 7 6 2 1 3 4
1986 8 5 7 6 3 1 2 4
1987 8 5 7 6 3 1 2 4
1988 8 5 7 6 3 1 2 4
1989 8 5 7 6 3 1 2 4
1990 6 4 2 1 3 5
1991 6 4 2 1 3 5
1992 6 4 2 1 3 5
1993 6 4 2 1 3 5
1994 6 4 2 1 3 5
1995 6 4 2 1 3 5
1996 6 4 2 1 3 5
1997 6 4 2 1 3 5
1998 5 3 2 1 4
1999 5 3 2 1 4
2000 5 3 2 1 4
2001 5 3 2 1 4
2002 4 2 1 3
The table shows the rankings of the large accounting firms based on the fees relating to the audit from 1985 to
2002. Firms are defined using their UK names in the year in question.
AA: Andersen (including its previous depiction of Arthur Andersen).
EW: Ernst and Whinney.
AY: Arthur Young.
EY: Ernst and Young (created by the merger of Arthur Young and Ernst and Whinney).
CL: Coopers and Lybrand.
DHS: Deloitte Haskins and Sells.
CLD: Coopers and Lybrand (created by the merger of Coopers and Lybrand with Deloitte Haskins and Sells).
KPMG: KPMG (including its previous depictions such as Peat Marwick).
PW: Price Waterhouse.
PWC: PricewaterhouseCoopers (created by the merger of Price Waterhouse with Coopers and Lybrand).
TR: Touche Ross.
D: Deloitte (created when the majority of Andersen’s clients were subsumed into the firm Deloitte and Touche).
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premium fees in a saturated market segment would
be of interest to regulators, because this might be a
sign of anti-competitive pricing policies. We first
address this possibility by running model 1 across
sub-samples partitioned across the quartile values
of the size of the client for the years of the Big
Firm mergers and each of the sub-periods where
there were eight, six, five and four dominant ac-
counting firms. The results of these estimations are
presented in Table 6.
The brand name premium is statistically signifi-
cant in 1985–1988 for most partitions and bigger
for the two largest audit client quartiles, consistent
with larger clients being willing to pay more for
auditor reputation in this period. This pattern
breaks down following the mergers in subsequent
periods. The brand name premium is statistically
significant for clients in the smallest quartile (the
competitive benchmark) in 1985–1989 (17.4%)
1991–1996 (8.8%) and 1998–2001 (29.7%). The
brand name premium is insignificant for clients in
the smallest quartile in 1989–1990 and 1997 and is
significant and negative in 2002 (consistent with a
highly competitive market). Similarly, for compa-
nies in the second largest quartile, significant
brand name returns are observed in 1985–1988
(11.5%), 1989–1990 (23.0%), 1991–1996
(22.2%), 1998–2001 (39.8%) and 2002 (87.8%).
Significant brand name returns are observed for
the subsample of companies in the third largest
quartile in 1985–1988 (20.8%) and 1991–1996
(25.8%). For the largest quartile of companies, the
brand name premium is statistically significant for
1985–1988 (37.1%) and 1991–1996 (32.6%). The
statistically significant negative coefficients on
Brand indicate that the audit fees paid to the Big
Firms by the largest quartile of clients were signif-
icantly lower than those paid to their smaller coun-
terparts in 1998–2001 (37.3%) and 2002 (53.6%).
If audit firms were engaging in anti-competitive
pricing strategies, we would expect to see the
strongest growth in brand name premia following
mergers amongst client groups most willing to pay
for reputation. Our mixed results in relation to
client size suggest that willingness to pay a brand
premium is not an increasing function of client
size. Our findings indicate that subsequent to the
Big Six mergers, the brand name premium increas-
es for mid-sized clients (i.e. those in the second
and third size quartiles) but falls in the quartiles
containing the smallest (competitive benchmark)
and largest companies. The brand name premium
also increases for clients of below median size and
falls for above-average sized clients following the
PricewaterhouseCoopers merger. The picture is
even more complex following the Deloitte-
Andersen transaction, where the premium falls for
the smallest and largest client quartiles but increas-
es for those in the second quartile. Following the
combinations, the brand name premium increases
for companies in the second quartile but is volatile
for all other quartiles. This pattern of results ap-
pears to be more consistent with the explanation
that audit firms engage in product differentiation
rather than anti-competitive pricing strategies. In
other words, price increases occurred only where
the mergers enabled the Big Firms to create new
products or services that were more appealing to
particular segments of the audit market. Our re-
sults suggest that such market segmentation is only
loosely related to the size of the client.
5.3 The effect of mergers on audit fees
The results obtained by estimating equation (2)
for the restricted sample of audit clients of firms
involved in mergers three years before, the year of
and three years11 subsequent to the combinations
are documented in Table 7. These regressions are
all significant at p<0.01, have strong explanatory
power (R2 of 81%–85%) and the control variables
exhibit the expected signs. The results reported in
the third column of Table 7 are estimated using the
sub-sample of 350 client-year observations relat-
ing to audits conducted by either Arthur Young or
Ernst and Whinney before the merger, and by the
new Ernst and Young firm after the merger. The
coefficient of 0.148 on PostEY is positive and sig-
nificant (p<0.05), consistent with Arthur Young
clients paying a fee increase of the order of 16%
after the merger. EYmerge is negative but insignif-
icant, suggesting little or no change in the audit
fees of former Ernst and Whinney clients after the
merger. EWpre is positive but not statistically sig-
nificant, suggesting no systematic difference in
audit fees paid by Ernst and Whinney clients from
those paid by the clients of Arthur Young prior to
the merger. These findings suggest that the merger
eliminated the audit fee premium of Ernst and
Whinney over Arthur Young. The results are con-
sistent with Baskerville and Hay’s (2006) argu-
ment that the combination was effectively a
takeover by the larger firm (Ernst and Whinney in
the UK), and with the proposition that the merger
improved the reputation of Arthur Young based on
the rankings reported in Table 5 and in Moizer
(2005).
The results reported in the fourth column of
Table 7 are estimated using the sub-sample of 532
client-year observations relating to audits conduct-
ed by Coopers and Lybrand or Deloitte, Haskins
and Sells before the merger, and by the new
Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte firm after the merg-
er. The coefficient on CLpre is not statistically sig-
nificant, a finding consistent with Cooper and
Lybrand clients and Deloitte, Haskins and Sells
Vol. 37 No. 4. 2007 311
11 One year for the Deloitte combination, due to a lack of
data.
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clients paying similar fees before the merger. The
coefficient on PostCLD is also not statistically sig-
nificant, implying that the clients of Deloitte,
Haskins and Sells did not suffer a fee increase 
after the merger. However, the coefficient for
CLDmerge is positive and significant (p<0.01) and
converts to a 14% post-merger premium paid by
Cooper and Lybrand clients. We interpret this as
evidence that the brand name reputation of
Coopers and Lybrand increased after the merger.
This interpretation is consistent with Table 5 and
the Moizer (2005) rankings of Deloitte, Haskins
and Sells and Coopers and Lybrand.
The results documented in the fifth column 
of Table 7 are estimated using the sub-sample of
978 client-year observations relating to audits con-
ducted by Price Waterhouse or Coopers and
Lybrand before the merger and by the new
PricewaterhouseCoopers firm after the merger.
PWpre is negative and significant at p<0.05, sug-
gesting that Price Waterhouse clients paid less for
audit services than clients of Coopers and Lybrand
before the merger. The coefficient of –0.078 corre-
sponds to a 7.8% discount. The coefficient on
PostPWC is not significant, indicating that
Coopers and Lybrand clients did not suffer a post-
merger fee increase. PWCmerge is not statistically
significant, consistent with Price Waterhouse
clients not paying more than did Coopers and
Lybrand clients after the merger. These results sug-
gest that the merger eliminated the significant dis-
count offered to Price Waterhouse clients relative
to Coopers and Lybrand clients. Consistent with
the rankings documented in Moizer (2005) and
Table 5, these findings suggest that the reputation
of Price Waterhouse increased relative to Coopers
and Lybrand when Price Waterhouse merged with
the larger firm.
The results presented in the final column of
Table 7 are estimated using a sub-sample of 117
client-year observations relating to audits conduct-
ed by Deloitte and Touche or Andersen before the
transaction and by the new Deloitte firm after the
transaction. For this combination, we modelled
audit fees one year preceding and one year after
the transaction because of the lack of availability
of more recent data at the time of collection.
Dmerge, DTpre and PostD are not significantly
different from zero. Subject to the aforementioned
caveat, this transaction does not seem to have had
any material audit pricing effects. The two firms
seem to have been on a similar footing prior to the
transaction. The finding that the Dmerge coeffi-
cient is also insignificant suggests that Deloitte
and Touche’s reputation did not suffer as a result of
the Andersen transaction.
Finally, the results of our OLS merger estimation
using inflation adjusted variables for the full sam-
ple of audit clients (model 3) are documented 
in Table 8. This regression is highly significant
(p<0.01), has strong explanatory power (adjusted
R2 of 80%) and the control variables exhibit the
expected signs. The coefficient of –0.165 for the
NBF variable is significant at p<0.05, consistent
with audit clients receiving a 15% discount rela-
tive to the benchmark firm (KPMG). The coeffi-
cient of 0.125 for the EYpost variable is
statistically significant at p<0.05, consistent with
Ernst and Young clients accepting a 13% increase
in fees after the merger vis-à-vis the benchmark
firm. The coefficient of 0.143 for the CLpost vari-
able is statistically significant (p<0.01), implying
that the clients of Coopers and Lybrand accepted a
15% fee increase after the merger. The coefficient
of –0.108 for the Apre variable is significant at
p<0.05, suggesting that Andersen clients paid 10%
less for audit services than the benchmark firm.
These results are consistent with our earlier find-
ings of product differentiation amongst the inter-
national accounting firms. The coefficients for the
EWpre, AYpre, CLpre, DHSpre, PWpre, Cpre,
PWCpost, Dpost and Dpre variables are all in-
significant, suggesting that they paid similar audit
fees to the benchmark firm.
5.4. Sensitivity checks
A series of sensitivity checks were performed to
test the robustness of our findings. The results are
not sensitive to the number of accounting firms
used to measure concentration or the number of
client size partitions created. Estimating model (1)
across loss making and non-loss-making sub-sam-
ples provides a means of testing the sensitivity of
the fee discounting findings to the financial per-
formance of clients. We also sequentially excluded
firms from model 1 to test whether one or a group
of accounting firms might drive the results.
Untabulated results indicate that the findings are
not sensitive to client profitability or auditor size.
We also varied the event window for model (3)
using data for one, two, three and four years before
and after the mergers, but results were not materi-
ally different. We tested the robustness of our find-
ings to model specification by running the
alternative estimations suggested by Firth and Lau
(2004). Finally we ran two sets of regressions for
the clients of merging firms before the mergers
and for the same clients after the mergers. The
general finding of these sensitivity checks is that
our results are not materially affected by model
specification.
6. Summary and conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature by investi-
gating the relationship between market concentra-
tion, accounting firm mergers and audit fee levels.
We find that concentration ratios increased be-
tween 1985 and 2002 to levels that exceed those
314 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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Table 7
OLS Audit fee regression models of log fees against dummies for clients of audit firms that have
merged over the sub-periods pre- and post- each merger
EY merger CLD merger PwC merger A transaction
Intercept ? –1.301 –1.529 –1.001 –1.493
(7.70) (7.87) (7.64) (6.76)
LTA + 0.468 0.498 0.447 0.512
(33.93) (33.48) (39.52) (25.40)
Sub + 0.230 0.214 0.218 0.187
(18.30) (15.29) (21.30) (12.53)
Current – –0.043 –0.226 –0.222 –0.303
(0.93) (6.81) (8.17) (5.95)
Quick + 0.075 0.206 0.183 0.363
(1.46) (4.78) (5.45) (5.12)
DTA + 0.222 0.323 0.011 0.093
(1.91) (1.67) (0.11) (0.38)
ROI – –0.094 –0.634 –0.239 –1.085
(0.51) (2.53) (1.67) (5.60)
Foreign + 0.192 0.287 0.699 0.534
(2.28) (3.30) (10.93) (7.16)
YE + 0.091 0.157 0.163 0.038
(2.24) (3.38) (4.98) (0.74)
Loss + 0.101 0.107 0.002 0.108
(1.75) (1.65) (0.04) (1.62)
EYmerge ? –0.08
(1.66)
EWpre ? 0.034
(0.53)
PostEY ? 0.148
(2.47)
CLDmerge ? 0.131
(2.81)
CLpre ? 0.016
(0.16)
PostCLD ? –0.003
(0.04)
PWCmerge ? 0.013
(0.39)
PWpre ? –0.078
(2.45)
PostPWC ? –0.064
(1.17)
Dmerge ? 0.015
(0.32)
DTpre ? 0.027
(0.52)
PostD ? –0.02
(0.39)
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observed in the prior literature to form a tight 
oligopoly market structure. Increased levels of
concentration seem to have reduced price compe-
tition and our client-size-partitioned results sug-
gest that this is due to product differentiation
rather than anti-competitive pricing. The reduction
in the number of top-tier audit firms has undoubt-
edly reduced auditee choice and increased the po-
tential for conflicts of interest. The international
firms have shown little signs of a willingness to
de-merge their audit activities and many multina-
tional companies do not see the mid-tier firms as a
viable auditor because of their limited resources.
We believe that regulators should carefully consid-
er what they would do in the event that one of the
Big Firms failed and a large corporation was
forced to retain an audit firm because of the lack of
available alternatives.
We also examine whether audit fee premiums or
discounts are offered by international audit firms
over their rivals and whether the pre-merger fee
premiums of the stronger brand name auditor
spread to the other auditor after a combination.
Our results indicate that there are differences both
within individual firms and across different firms
in the pre- and post-merger levels of real and nom-
inal audit fees. Looking first at nominal audit fees,
we find that the Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte
merger increased the audit fee premium of
Coopers and Lybrand over the clients formerly 
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Table 7
OLS Audit fee regression models of log fees against dummies for clients of audit firms that have
merged over the sub-periods pre- and post- each merger (continued)
EY merger CLD merger PwC merger A transaction
N 350 532 978 117
F 304a 293a 533a 254a
R2 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.84
Model (2 EY merger):
LAFi = α2,0 + β2,1 EWprei + β2,2 PostEYi + β2,3 EYmergei + β2,13 Controlsi + ε2,i
Model (2 CLD merger):
LAFi = α2,0 + β2,4 CLprei + β2,5 PostCLDi + β2,6 CLDmergei + β2,13 Controlsi + ε2,i
Model (2 PwC merger):
LAFi = α2,0 + β2,7 PWprei + β2,8 PostPWCi + β2,9 PWCmergei + β2,13 Controlsi + ε2,i
Model (2 D-A transaction):
LAFi = α2,0 + β2,10 DTprei + β2,11 PostDi + β2,12 Dmergei + β2,13 Controlsi + ε2,i
a significant at the 1% level. The coefficients shown in bold are significant at the 5% level. The first figure in
each panel shows the parameter estimate and the second figure the t-statistic (two-tailed) for each variable. The
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the audit fee. LTA= natural logarithm of total assets (£m); Sub
= square root of the number of subsidiaries; Current = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; Quick = ratio
of current assets less stock to current liabilities; DTA= ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI= ratio of
earnings before interest and tax to total assets; Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations;
YE= 1 if the fiscal year-end is between December and March inclusive, 0 otherwise; Loss = 1 if an operating
loss was reported in any of the prior three years, 0 otherwise;
EWpre = 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and the auditor is Ernst and Whinney, if the auditor prior
to the merger is Arthur Young or the observation is after the merger then EWpre is 0; PostEY = 1 for a post-
merger observation, 0 otherwise; EYmerge = 1 for a post-merger observation where the client was originally
audited by Ernst and Whinney, 0 otherwise; CLpre = 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and the auditor
at that time is Coopers and Lybrand, 0 otherwise; PostCLD = 1 for a post-merger observation, 0 otherwise;
CLDmerge = 1 if the observation is after the merger and the original auditor was Coopers and Lybrand, 0 oth-
erwise; PWpre = 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and the auditor at that time is Price Waterhouse, 0
otherwise; PostPWC = 1 for a post-merger observation, 0 otherwise; PWCmerge = 1 if the observation is after
the merger and the original auditor was Price Waterhouse, 0 otherwise; DTpre = 1 if the observation is prior to
the transaction and the auditor at that time is Deloitte and Touche, 0 otherwise; PostD = 1 for a post-transac-
tion observation, 0 otherwise; Dmerge = 1 if the observation is after the transaction and the original auditor
was Deloitte and Touche, 0 otherwise.
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audited by Deloitte. The Ernst and Young merger 
significantly increased the audit fees of former
Arthur Young clients relative to those of Ernst and
Whinney. The PricewaterhouseCoopers merger
eliminated the discount offered by Price Waterhouse
relative to Coopers and Lybrand clients. Finally, the
Andersen transaction seems to have had no materi-
al effect to date. These results are consistent with
the proposition that the brand name reputation of
the smaller firms improved following the mergers
with their larger counterparts. Finally, looking at
real audit fees, we find that the Coopers and
Lybrand Deloitte, Ernst and Young mergers and the
Andersen transaction increased the audit fee premi-
ums of Coopers and Lybrand and Ernst and Young
and reduced the reputation problem associated with
Vol. 37 No. 4. 2007 317
Table 8
OLS Audit fee regression models of log real audit fees against audit-time identity dummies for all
clients over the period 1985–2002
coefficient t-statistics
Intercept ? –1.286 (17.37)
EWpre ? –0.019 (0.23)
AYpre ? –0.038 (0.44)
EYpost ? 0.125 (2.06)
CLpre ? –0.099 (1.14)
DHSpre ? 0.039 (0.45)
CLpost ? 0.143 (2.74)
PWpre ? 0.057 (1.87)
Cpre ? 0.064 (1.70)
PWCpost ? 0.02 (0.68)
Dpre ? –0.057 (1.66)
Apre ? –0.108 (2.27)
Dpost ? –0.007 (0.22)
NBF – –0.165 (7.31)
N 7255
F 816a
R2 0.805
Model 3:
LRAFi = α3,0 + β3,1EWprei + β3,2AYprei + β3,3EYposti + β3,4CLprei + β3,5DHSprei + β3,6CLposti
+ β3,7PWpre + β3,8Cprei + β3,9PWCposti + β3,10Dprei + β3,11Aprei + β3,12Dposti + β3,13NBFi
+ β3,14Controlsi + ε3,i
a significant at the 1% level. The coefficients shown in bold are significant at the 5% level. The first figure in
each panel shows the parameter estimate and the second figure the t-statistic (two-tailed) for each variable. The
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the inflation adjusted (real) audit fee.
EWpre takes the value of 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and Ernst and Whinney are the auditors and
Ernst and Young audit the client after the merger. AYpre takes the value of 1 if the observation is prior to the
merger and Arthur Young are the auditors and Ernst and Young audit the client after the merger. EYpost takes
the value of 1 if the auditor prior to the merger is Ernst and Whinney and Ernst and Young audit the client after
the merger. CLpre takes the value of 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and Coopers and Lybrand are
the auditors and Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte audit the client after the merger. DHSpre takes the value of 1 if
the observation is prior to the merger and Deloitte, Haskins and Sells are the auditors and Coopers and Lybrand
Deloitte audit the client after the merger. CLpost takes the value of 1 if the auditor prior to the merger is Coopers
and Lybrand and Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte audit the client after the merger. PWpre takes the value of 1 if
the observation is prior to the merger and Price Waterhouse are the auditors and PricewaterhouseCoopers audit
the client after the merger. Cpre takes the value of 1 if the observation is prior to the merger and Coopers and
Lybrand are the auditors and PricewaterhouseCoopers audit the client after the merger. PWCpost takes the
value of 1 if the auditor prior to the merger is Price Waterhouse and PricewaterhouseCoopers audit the client
after the merger. Dpre takes the value of 1 if the observation is prior to the transaction and Deloitte and Touche
are the auditors and Deloitte audit the client after the transaction. Apre takes the value of 1 if the observation
is prior to the transaction and Andersen are the auditors and Deloitte audit the client after the transaction. Dpost
takes the value of 1 if the auditor prior to the transaction is Deloitte and Touche and Deloitte now audits the
client. NBF takes the value of 1 if a non brand-name firm audits the client.D
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Andersen relative to clients audited by the bench-
mark firm that was not involved in merger activity
(KPMG).
The study is subject to a number of limitations.
In particular, caution should be exercised in as-
suming that these results can be generalised to
apply to other countries and time periods because
of differences in the structure of the markets and
changes in the economic climate. Additionally, the
paper might underestimate the extent of price-cut-
ting because the auditor change variables are not
able to distinguish more subtle market pressures.
For example, auditor switch dummies will not
identify cases where the incumbent auditor is reap-
pointed in the tender process and any reductions
will show as a fee cut by the incumbent auditor.
Auditor switch dummies also cannot distinguish
between efficiency gains, discounts from a normal
fee and clients responding to excessively high fees
by choosing to switch. Similarly, any fee reduc-
tions by the incumbent auditor resulting from pres-
sure from the client, such as a threat to offer for
tender, will not be identified. Furthermore, one is
unable to generalise the results to all accounting
firm mergers. We chose to focus on the pricing ef-
fects of mergers between the international ac-
counting firms because they are likely to have a
greater impact on concentration ratios and audit
fees than mergers between small- and medium-
sized firms due to their greater size and effect on
market share. One downside with this is that the
identity of the firm with the superior reputation is
not obvious because the audit firms concerned are
similar in size and level of expertise. Finally, due
to the lack of available data, we are unable to in-
vestigate the effect of mergers on auditors’ charge-
out rates and costs. It is therefore impossible to
ascertain whether the premium fees are distributed
to partners, recognised in remunerating the em-
ployees of the firm or used to cover additional un-
foreseen costs.
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